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November 10, 1986 
Supreme Court 
State of Utah 
Attn: Geoffrey J* Butler 
Clerk of Court 
322 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Re: Patricia Christiansen vs. Holiday 
Rent-A-Car dba Flexi-Lease, Inc.et al. 
Case No. 19700 
Dear Mr. Butler: 
Pursuant to Rule 24(J) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, respondent in the above-referred matter hereby 
submits citations of supplemental authorities. These 
authorities became available after the filing of briefs in this 
matter. 
The cases of Hitt vs. Cox, 737 F.2d 421 (4th 
Cir. 1984) and Freeman vs. Schmidt Real Estate and 
Insurance, 755 F.2d 135 (8th Cir. 1985) both relate to 
Point 11(E) at Page 25 of Respondent's Brief herein. The case 
of Steil vs. Florida Physicians Insurance Reciprocal, 448 
S.2d 589 (Fla. App. 1984) relates to Point III of 
Respondent's Brief at Page 31. 
Copies of all of these cases are attached hereto for the , 
court's convenience. 
Sincerely yours, 
RICHARDS, BI 
& NELSON 
ERT 
MILLER 
EVENS 
cc: Samuel King 
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Cite as 755 F.2d 135 (1985) 
In the main whether the appellees negligently breached 
their duty to warn of the hazards of the 
rims was presented to the jury and the 
question was resolved by the jury against 
the appellants. Appellants' position that 
the appellees should have voluntarily re-
called th$ rims was apparent throughout 
the course of the trial and further elabora-
tion in the duty to warn instruction was not 
necessary or proper. If the jury did not 
find appellees negligent for failing to warn, 
they could not logically have found them 
negligent for failing to recall. 
In summary, we find no basis for rever-
sal predicated upon the trial court's eviden-
tiary rulings and negligence instructions to 
the jury, and we affirm the judgment of 
the district court entered in accordance 
with the verdict of the jury. 
souri Approved Instructions, 
appellees argue that the district court cor-
rectly refused to add appellants' proposed 
failure to recall element because no duty to 
recall the rims existed under state or feder-
al law. We agree. 
[81 Generally, under. Missouri law, to 
establish a case of actionable negligence 
plaintiff must demonstrate that the defend-
ant owed a duty to the plaintiff, that the 
defendant breached the duty, through act 
or omission, and that plaintiff was thereby 
proximately injured. See Virginia D. v. 
Madesco Investment Corp., 648
 f S.W.2d 
881,886 (Mo.1983) (en banc); see also Nel-
son v. Freeman, 537 F.Supp. 602, 607 
(W.D.Mo.1982), affd sub notru Nelson By 
Wharton v. Missouri Division of Family 
Services, 706 F.2d 276 (8th Cir.1983). In 
addition, whether a duty existed is to be 
determined by the court. Hyde v. City of 
Columbia, 637 S.W.2d 251, 257 (Mo.App. 
1982), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1226,103 S.Ct 
1233, 75 L.Ed.2d 467 (1983). 
(91 Appellants provide no statute or 
atee law to support their position that ap-
pellees were under a legal duty to recall 
the rims, such a duty may have 
existed had the Department of Transporta-
tion ordered a recall, see The National Traf-
fic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 
15 U.S.C. §§ 1411-20, no such notification 
of defect and remedy order had been given 
pertaining to these rims. Since no duty to 
recall was established, a fundamental pre-
requisite to establishing negligence was ab-
sent See Nelson, supra, 706 F.2d at 277. 
Although a party has a general right to 
have an instruction presenting its theory of 
the case, a plaintiff has no right to submit 
to the jury an instruction unsupported by 
the evidence adduced at trial. Beard v. 
Mitchell, 604 F.2d 485, 497 (7th Cir.1979). 
further there is no error in the trial 
Court's refusal to incorporate the duty to 
recall within the duty to warn under the 
fycts of this case. We find no basis for 
luch an equation, see 2A Frumer and Fried-
man, Products Liability § 17A.01 (1984 
ed), nor do we perceive any prejudice for 
failing to include it. The central issue of 
§ KEY NUMBER SYSTEM V 
Charlie G. FREEMAN, Appellant, 
v. 
SCHMIDT REAL ESTATE & INSUR-
ANCE, INC., Niels R. Schmidt, and 
AID Insurance Company, Appellees. 
No. 84-1227. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Eighth Circuit. 
Submitted Oct. 9, 1984. 
Decided Feb. 20, 1985. 
Rehearing Denied March 2$, 1985 
Injured party brought action against 
insurance agent, agency, and insurance 
company for their negligent failure to pro-
cure liability insurance for insured. In-
jured party also alleged agent and insurer 
had breached their duty to him by failing to 
procure insurance for insured. The United 
States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Iowa, James D. Hodges, Magis-
trate, entered summary judgment for $e-
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fendants, and injured party appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, Jphn R. Gibson, Circuit 
Judge, held that: (1) claim assigned to in-
jured party by insured was not enforceable, 
and (2) under Iowa law there is no direct 
cause of action by crash victim against 
insurer for failure to procure automobile 
liability insurance for tort-feasor. 
Affirmed. 
Heaney, Circuit Judge, filed dissenting 
opinion anc( would have granted rehearing. 
1. United States Magistrates <3=»5 
In diversity cases, magistrates' conclu-
Court of Appeals as to questions of purely 
local law. 
2. Assignments ^ 7 1 
Under Iowa law, tort-feasors never be-
came legally obligated to make any pay-
ments to injured party by virtue of cove-
nant not to execute; thus, injured party 
received no enforceable rights from them 
when they assigned their rights against 
agent, agency and insurance company for 
their negligent failure to procure liability 
insurance for tort-feasors. 
3. Insurance <3=*92.1 
Under Iowa law, there is no duty from 
insurance agents to potential injured party 
such as to give injured party direct cause 
of action against insurers for negligence in 
failing to procure insurance for tort-fea-
sors. 
Simmons, Perrine, Albright & Ellwood, 
James R. Snyder, Gregory M. Lederer, Ce-
dar Rapids, Iowa, for appellees Schmidt 
Real Estate & Ins., Inc. 
Crawford, Sullivan, Read & Roemerman, 
James W. Crawford, Thomas B. Read, Ce-
dar Rapids, Iowa, for appellee AID Ins. Co. 
Max E. Kirk, Ball, Kirk, Holm & Mardini, 
P.C., Waterloo, Iowa, for appellant. 
1. The Honorable James D. Hodges, United 
States Magistrate for the Northern District of 
Iowa. The parties consented to the assignment 
Bafore HEANEY, Circuit Judge, HEN-
J,EV> Senior Circuit Judge, and JOHN R. 
GIgSON, Circuit Judge. 
j#HN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge. 
Qjiarlie G. Freeman appeals from a sum-
mar^ judgment entered against him in his 
actj#n against Schmidt Real Estate & In-
surance, Inc., Niels R. Schmidt, and AID 
Insurance Company for their negligent fail-
ure t° procure liability insurance for Rus-
sejl K. Catron. Freeman and Catron were 
jnv(7lved in an automobile collision, and in 
se^Jement of the resulting litigation, Ca-
tron* confessed judgment and assigned his 
^a-fcts against the agent, agency and insur-
a n t company to Freeman in exchange for 
preeman's promise not to execute on the 
ju(j£ment. Freeman then brought this suit 
aUeging both the assigned claim that the 
agent and insurer had breached their duty 
to patron to procure insurance and a direct 
cjajrn that those same parties had breached 
a n independent duty to him in failing to 
meet Catron's request. The magistrate1 
rej#cted the existence of such an indepen-
dent c a u s e °f action and also concluded 
t^ t Freeman, because of the agreement 
no^ to execute and the "indemnity nature" 
0f insurance generally, gained no enforce-
able rights through the assignment from 
Cation. We affirm. 
(jatron in the fall of 1978 had had a 
conversation with Niels Schmidt in which 
gcjjfnidt allegedly agreed on behalf of his 
agency anc* AID Insurance Company to 
Cy protecting Catron from losses resulting 
frorn the use of his vehicles. On Novem-
ber 16, 1978, a vehicle owned by Catron 
and operated by Mrs. Catron was involved 
j n a collision in which Charlie Freeman was 
injured. Freeman brought suit against the 
Matrons, invoking federal diversity jurisdic-
tion. AID defended the action under a 
previously issued, undisputed $50,000 liabil-
ity policy, with a reservation of rights de-
nying coverage in excess of that amount. 
i0 a magistrate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) 
(1982). 
* 755 F. 
The case was FL-II... .1 m. ;:n.' lulu, wing 
terms: 
1, The Catrons confessed judgment : 
$350,000.00 and costs, 
2. Freeman agreed not to execute 
against the Catrons on any amount 
of the judgment'in excess of $50,-
000.00, 
3. [AID paid its $50,000:00 liability lim-
its to Freeman], and 
4, [T]he Catrons assigned to Freeman 
their cause of action against the 
Schmidt agency and' any other neces-
sary person or entity for the agen-
cy's failure to obtain a $300,000.00 
policy that would have covered the 
liability asserted against them by 
Freeman. 
Freeman v. Schmidt J It ul Est a te & Insur-
ance, Inc., No. C 82 ' i 8 \\\ »j: • at 3 (N.D. 
Iowa Feb. 2, 1984), 
Thereafter, Freeman brought this action 
alleging as the Catrons' assignee that 
Schmidt, the agency, and AID (hereafter 
"the insurers") were negligent and breach-
ed an oral contract in failing to obtain the 
additional liability insurance policy in the 
amount of $300,000. Freeman further al-
leged that the insurers' failure constituted 
a negligent breach of a duty owed directly 
to him as the victim of an automobile colli-
sion who would foreseeably be harmed by 
the Catrons'' lack of coverage., 
I he magistrate granted summary judg-
ment for the insurers. While observing 
that no Iowa case (the parties agree Iowa 
law controls) was directly on point, he went 
on to state: 
It is equally clear that an insurance con-
tract is basically a contract of indemnity. 
Hence, since the Catrons never became 
legally obligated to make any payments 
to plaintiff by virtue of the covenant not 
to execute they would have been entitled 
to nothing under the policy and hence 
have suffered no damage. Accordingly, 
plaintiff received no enforceable rights 
from them and the fact that the underly-
ing obligation was not extinguished is 
irrelevant. 
2d 135 {198"=. 
Freman, slip op. at 6. I he magistrate 
,J - r.ilvd that under Iowa law potential 
.;r* vk'tims of possible automobile ace: 
aents do not constitute a discernible class 
as to whom a tortfeasor whose duty is 
created Jjy contract n.
 ty be ji:;!.le despite 
the lack of privity, 
[1] In diversity cases we ordinarily ac 
cord substantial weight to the decisions of 
experienced district judges on 'questions of 
local 'law which have not yet.been treated 
by state courts.' Keltner v. Ford Motor 
Co., 748 F.2d 1265, 1267 (8th Cir.1984); 
Kansas State Bank v. Citizens Bank, 737 
F.2d 1490, 1496 (8th Cir.1984). We have 
earlier stated that bankruptcy judges' con-
clusions are entitled to some deference as 
to questions of purely local law, Grenz 
Super Valu v. Fix, 566 F.2d 614, 615 (8th 
Cir.1977) (per curiam), and we feel no hesi-
tation in considering similarly that weight 
also should be given to comparable deci-
sions of magistrates. The magistrate's or-
der here carefully analyzes the applicable 
law, .and our research reveals no relevant 
precedents not fully examined by him. See 
Schuster v. U.S. News'& World Report, 
Inc., 602 F.2d 850, 854 (8th Cir.1979). We" 
cannot conclude that the magistrate's pre-
diction of Iowa law is erroneous. 
I. 
As the magistrate recognized, states dif-
fer as to whether an insurer may be liable 
to the injured party when the insured be-
fore judgment, is protected by an agree-
ment not to execute. Cases reaching.the 
result urged by Freeman basically follow 
one of two rationales. 
First, under the typical liability insurance 
policy, an insurer must reimburse the in-
sured only as to amounts which the insured 
she ,11 become legally obligated to pay as 
damages." A covenant not -to execute, 
some courts hold, is merely a contract, and 
not a release, such that the underlying tort 
liability remains and a breach of contract 
action lies if the injured party seeks to 
collect his judgment. Thus, the tortfeasor 
is still "legally obligated" to the injured 
party, and the insurer still must make good 
7.->•-» KKDr.KAL RKPOftTJ .U. Jd S K U I E S 
«.:! ii- • tK.trai'iual promise to
 ray. .buic'c 
/^nrw Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 
- binder, 122 Ariz. 198, 593 P.2d 948, 953 
(Ct.App.l(J79); Globe Indemnity Co. v. 
Blomfidd, 115 Ariz. 5, 562 P.2d 1372, 1375 
(Ct.App.1977); cf. Critz v. Farmers Insur-
ance Group, 230 Cal.App.2d 788, 41 "ai. 
Rptr. 401, 410 (1964) (agreemem i«,;!.':n-
tortfeasor harmless as to judgrm •-; : . • \ 
cess of his insurance coverage doeMi L i n -
close suit against insurer for bad-faith fan 
ure to settle). An uninsured party wouh. 
then be injured by the agent's negligent 
in failing to procure a policy because he 
would have the outstanding "liability" 
against which he sought to insure.2 
• The policy rationale used by other states 
reaching the result urged by Freeman fo-
cuses primarily on the right of the insured 
to protect himself from bad faith conduct 
of his insurer. For example, the Nebraska 
Supreme Court has held that an insured, 
and thus the insurer, is "legally obligated 
to pay" within the meaning of the policy 
despite an agreement not to execute when 
the insured enters into such an agreement 
to protect himself from the insurer's denial 
of coverage and refusal to defend under 
the policy. Metcalf v. Hartford Accident 
& Indemnity Co., 176 Neb. 468, 126 
N.W.2d 471 (1964). The Nebraska court 
stressed that the insurer had "repudiated 
its obligation" to the insured, id., 126 
N.W.2d at.476, and some element of mis-
conduct by the insurer generally has been 
present in the cases in which courts have 
followed Metcalf. E,g., American Family 
2. Liability insurance, which is the most com-
mon form of automobile insurance and is ap-
parently what Freeman spught here, is to be 
distinguished from indemnity insurance, under 
which the insurer has no duty to reimburse 
until the insured has actually paid out money, 
rather than just when the insured becomes "ob-
ligated" to pay. See Steffens v. American Stan-
dard Ins. Co., 181 N.W.2d 174, 175, 176 (Iofca 
1970). 
3. It is not clear that Kelly v. Williams, 411 So.2d 
902, 904 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.), petition for review 
denied, 419 So.2d 1198 (Fla.1982), belongs with 
this group of cases, as cited by the insurers. 
Kelly held that an insurer cannot be liable on a 
third-party claim of bad-faith failure to settle 
when Its insured is protected by agreement 
- v i.. t a i >nsjra?ice ("<;•. v. Ki v e I a, 408 
N.E.2d 805, 813 (Ind.Ct.App.1980) (insurer 
"abandoned" insured when it refused to 
defend on the ground that the policy had 
been revoked for false statements on the 
application); Griggs v. Bertram, 88 NJ. 
347. 443 A.2d 163 (1982) (insurer failed to 
promptly notify insured that it was denying 
"
,
'
v
-rage). Even those courts which base 
'' • - findings of liability on the distinction 
veen a release and a covenant not to 
•ute acknowledge the policy implica-
•'-• of an opposite conclusion—settle-
ments such as the one here would no long-
er serve their intended purpose. E.g., 
Paynter, 593 P.2d at 953. 
Cases reaching the result urged by the 
insurers here give the "legally obligated to 
pay" language the practical construction 
adopted by the magistrate: An insured pro-
tected by a covenant not to execute has no 
compelling obligation to pay any sum to the 
injured party; thus, the insurance policy 
imposes no obligation on the insurer. 
Stubblefield v. St. Paul Fire & Marine 
Insurance Co., 267 Or'. 397, 517 P.2d 262, 
264 (1973) (en banc); Bendall v. White, 511 
F.Supp. 793, 795 (N.D.Ala, 1981); Huffman 
v. Peerless Insurance Co., 17 N.C.App. 
292, 193 S.E.2d 773, 774, cert denied, 283 
N.C. 257, 195 S.E.2d 689 (1973).3 An indi-
vidual who is uninsured due to an agent's 
negligence then will have suffered no dam-
ages, as he would have had no rights under 
the policy anyway. While this interpreta-
tion does prevent use of settlements such 
as that entered'into by the parties here, we 
from an excess judgment, The court, however, 
also distinguished the situation where the in* 
jui ed party brings suit as the insured's assignee 
rather than asserting a direct claim and suggest 
ed that the judgment against the insured would 
not be "blotted out" because it could affect cred-
it ai id title to real estate. Id{ This latter state* 
n lent seems more in keeping with those cases 
above that hold that an insured protected by an. 
agreement not to execute does still have legal 
liabilities and damages giving rise to an obliga-
tion on the part of the insurer. Furthermore, 
another Florida District Court of Appeal panel 
cei tified its opinion in Fidelity dt Casualty Co, v. 
Cope, 444 So.2d 1041, 1046 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 
1984), as being in direct conflict with Kelly. 
FREEMAN v. SCHMIDT REAL ESTATE & INS. 
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agree with the magistrate that Iowa public 
policy does not require a different result in 
this case. 
Injured parties in Iowa have available 
other means whereby they may, after ob-
taining a judgment against an insured, gain 
the insured's rights against the insurer. 
E.g., Steffens v. American Standard In-
stance Co., 181 N.W.2d 174 (Iowa 1970) 
(injured party after obtaining and-execu-
ting a judgment against insured could 
levy on insured's cause of action against 
insurer and purchase it at a sheriffs sale). 
The issue, therefore, is whether the addi-
tional procedure of prejudgment assign-
ment in return for a promise not to execute 
also should be available. Iowa's concerns 
with permitting such a procedure are ap-
parent from cases that erect barriers 
against possibility of collusive settlement. 
For example, in Roach v. Estate of Raven-
stein, 326 F.Supp. 830 (S.D.Iowa 1971), the 
experienced District Judge Hanson denied 
a motion for a consent judgment where the 
settlement involved assignment by the ad-
ministrator of the deceased insured's rights 
against the insurer in exchange for the 
injured party's agreement to seek satisfac-
tion of the judgment only from the estate's 
rights in the insurance policy. The court 
held that the agreement was beyond the 
authority of the administrator due to the 
administrator's failure to investigate the 
merits of the claim against the insured or 
to seek necessary probate court approval 
and that the agreement was unconsciona-
ble as forcing the insurer to either forgo a 
good-faith denial of coverage or risk being 
bound by any settlement the insured might 
choose to make. The court expressly 
found that the purpose of the settlement 
had been to "relieve the Plaintiff from the 
burden of proving its claim and establish-
ing the liability of, the Defendant estate 
and to prevent a defense by the insurer." 
Id. at 834. Plaintiff's counsel had actually 
been directing the administrator's activi-
ties. Such collusion, however, would be 
possible anytime the insured were protect-
ed by an agreement not to execute prior to 
entry of judgment; the insured thus loses 
the incentive to contest his liability or the 
extent of the injured party's damages ei-
ther in negotiations or at trial. 
[2] Furthermore, the policy concerns 
that cause some states to allow such settle-
ments are less pressing when the claim 
against the insurer is to be negligent fail-
ure to "procure insurance rather than bad 
faith refusal to settle or to defend. In-
sureds and injured parties alike may need 
the'possibility of an assignment and cove-
nant not to execute as" a weapon against 
insurer misconduct surrounding claims 
made under the policy. Cf Critz v. Farm-
ers Insurance Group, 230 Cal.App.2d 788, 
41 Cal.Rptr. 401, 408-09 (1964). When the 
insurer's breach of its obligations, how-
ever, is merely negligent and is removed in 
time and nature from the settlement con-
text, such agreements will have less, deter-
rent effect on insurer practices, and their 
possible usefulness in this regard is out-
weighed by the concern with collusion. We 
cannot find the magistrate was incorrect in 
his conclusion that Iowa courts would read 
the "legally obligated to pay" policy lan-
guage to protect insurers when their in-
sureds are protected by prejudgment cove-
nants not to execute. 
II. 
[3] We also agree with the magistrate 
that Iowa courts would not find a duty 
running from insurance agents to potential 
injured parties such as to give Freeman a 
direct cause of action against the insurers 
here for negligence in failing to procure 
insurance for Catron. The seminal Iowa 
case is Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395 
(Iowa 1969), in which the state supreme 
court for the first time recognized that 
professionals might have some duty of care 
running to persons other than those who 
contracted for their services, The court 
held that an accountant making a negligent 
misrepresentation could be liable to a per-
son who suffered loss in reliance on the 
false statement and who was known to the 
accountant as a prospective user. Id. at 
401-03. The court found it unnecessary to 
determine whether such liability should ex-
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tend to all foreseeable persons, but it did 
say the scope of the duty should be influ-
enced by "the end and aim of the transac-
tion." Id. at 403. 
Later Iowa Supreme Court opinions have 
reaffirmed the concern with potentially un-
limited liability, e.g., Brody v. Ruby, 267 
N.W.2d 902, 906 (Iowa 1978), and our dis-
trict judges on previous occasions also have 
refused to give Ryan an expansive reading. 
See Briggs v. Sterner, 529 F.Supp. 1155, 
1176-77 (S.D.Iowa 1981). The duty of pro-
fessionals runs not to all'reasonably fore-
seen injured parties but just to those actu-
ally foreseen "taking into consideration the 
end and aim of the transaction." Beech v. 
Kapalis, 302 N.W.2d 90, 97 (Iowa 1981). 
The aim of the alleged transaction be-
tween Catron and the insurance agent 
Schmidt was to protect Catron and to pro-
tect him from liability. In states where 
insurance agents have been held to have a 
duty to poteritial injured parties, insurance 
as a matter of public policy generally is 
characterized as creating a "fund" to com-
pensate accident victims. E.g., Eschle v. 
Eastern Freight Ways, 128 NJ.Super. 299, 
319 A.2d 786, 787 (Law Div.1974). We 
have been cited to no materials showing 
that Iowa has adopted such a view, and 
Walker v. American Family Mutual In-
surance Co., 340 N.W.2d 599 (Iowa 1983), 
in fact, has strong language to the con-
trary.4 Furthermore, the Iowa Supreme 
Court in Long v. McAllister, 319 N.W.2d 
256, 262 (Iowa 1982), declined to recognize 
a duty of an insurer directly to the injured 
party to settle in good faith, stressing that 
the interests of an insured and insurer are 
aligned against the interests of the injured 
party. A more expansive concept as to the 
purposes of automobile liability insurance 
in Iowa would contradict our recognition in 
section I, supra, of this opinion that an 
4. In Walker, the Iowa Supreme Court declined 
to invalidate an exclusionary clause in an insur-
ance contract as against public policy. The 
court stressed that the legislature had not enact-
ed a compulsory insurance law and made the 
following observations: "Our more recent deci-
sions * * * [find] no legislative intent to require 
all motorists to have liability insurance and 
therefore no legislative expression of a public 
policy to protect all victims of traffic accidents/' 
insurer has an obligation to pay money 
under a policy only after the insured has 
incurred liability. The "ends and aim" of 
the insurance transaction contemplate a 
duty only to others, for example, possibly 
Catron's wife, who would have been pro-
tected under the policy as to their liability. 
Cf. Waddell v. Davis, 571 S.W.2d 844 
(Tenn.Ct.App.1978) (plaintiff had a direct 
action as a third-party beneficiary against 
the insurance agent for negligent failure to 
procure uninsured motorist coverage if, as 
passenger in car, she would have been an 
"insured" within the meaning of the policy 
sought by her driver). 
This focus similarly distinguishes the 
Massachusetts case of Rae v. Air-Speedf 
Inc., 386 Mass. 187, 435 N.E.2d 628 (1982), 
heavily relied upon by Freeman. The in-
surance sought there was workers' com-
pensation insurance, which by its very na-
ture and purpose does not require that an 
injured employee establish liability on the 
part of the employer before recovering. 
The essence of workers' compensation is 
protection of workers from injuries and not 
protection of employers from liability; 
thus, when an employer approaches an in-
surance agent about workers' compensa-
tion, employees are "actually foreseen" 
parties within the "end and aim of the 
transaction" to whom the agent would owe 
a duty under Iowa law. The Massachu-
setts court, in fact, found the employees to 
be third-party beneficiaries of the contract 
to obtain workers' compensation insurance, 
id., 435 N.E.2d at 633, while the Iowa Su-
preme Court in contrast has found injured 
parties not to be third-party beneficiaries 
of automobile liability policies. Long, 319 
N.W.2d at 262. The magistrate did not err 
in his conclusion that Iowa courts similarly 
would not extend the liability of insurers to 
the situation here. 
340 N.W.2d at 601; "[The cases* cited] do not, 
however, declare a judicial policy requiring 
automobile insurers to reimburse all persons 
injured by negligent operators of insured vehi-
cles," id. at 602; *'[0]ur statutes and decided 
cases disclose no such broad public policy [of 
'assuring protection to the innocent victims of 
automobile accidents'] as was relied upon by the 
Washington Supreme Court." Id. at 603. 
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Since we conclude, as matters of law, curity income benefits. 
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first that the claim assigned to Freeman 
was not enforceable because Catron was 
not "legally obligated to pay" any judg-
ment and thus had no rights against his 
insurers, and second that Iowa would not 
recognize a direct action by a crash victim 
against an insurer for failure to procure 
automobile liability insurance for the tort-
feasor, the summary judgment in favor of 
the injsurers must be affirmed. 
HEANEY, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
I respectfully dissent. While I do not 
disagree with the majority's conclusion that 
decisions of a magistrate should be given 
weight, I cannot agree that he correctly 
resolved the legal issue in the jase. In my 
view, the Iowa state courts would be more 
likely to follow the views of those states 
that would permit recovery than those that 
would not. Of course, in any action, the 
insured would have to prove his damages 
and the insurer would have a right to as-
sert any defense that it might have had if 
the insurance had been purchased as re-
quested. This simple safeguard would pre-
vent any collusive settlement. 
There are no policy reasons to deny relief 
to the plaintiffs. To the contrary, the neg-
ligent insurer should bear the responsibility 
rather than the innocent plaintiff. 
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Gene KNIPE, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
Margaret M. HECKLER, Secretary, 
Department of Health and Human 
Services, Defendant-Appellee. 
No. 84-1179. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Tenth Circuit. 
Feb. 13, 1985. 
Claimant sought social security disabil-
ity insurance benefits and supplemental se-
The Secretary of 
Health and Human Services determined 
claimant was not disabled under Social Se-
curity Act and denied request for benefits. 
Claimant sought District Court review. 
The United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Oklahoma, Frank How-
ell Seay, Chief Judge, affirmed decision, 
and appeal was taken. The Court of Ap-
peals, Holloway, Chief Judge, held that: (1) 
finding of no disability w%s not supported 
by substantial evidence, and (2) claimant 
was per se disabled. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Social Security and Public Welfare 
<3=>143.60 
Claimant's heart impairments met list-
ing of impairments, and therefore, findings 
of Secretary of Health and Human Services 
that claimant was not disabled were not 
supported by substantial evidence. Social 
Security Administration Regulations, 
§§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525(a), 404.1598, App. 
1. §§ 1.00 et seq., 4.04, subd. D, 42 U.S.C. 
A. App. 
2. Social Security and Public Welfare 
<S 1^40.10 
When claimant's disability is equal to 
or more severe than impairment in listing 
of impairments, he is per se disabled. So-
cial Security Administration Regulations, 
§§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525(a), 404.1598, App. 
1, §§ 1.00 et seq., 4.04, subd. D, 42 U.S.C. 
A. App. 
3. Social Security and Public Welfare 
<S=>140.20 
To establish chest pain of cardiac ori-
gin for disability purposes, pain need not 
occur during stress tests nor must it occur 
at any threshold of frequency or, duration, 
Social Security Administration Regulations, 
§ 404.1598, App. 1, §§ 4.00, subd. E, 4.04, 
subd. D, 42 U.S.C.A. App. 
4. Social Security and Public Welfare 
^140.20 
Claimant was disabled, where his low 
22% ejection fraction measured at cardiac 
Vivian M. HITT, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Luther COX, individually and as Sheriff 
of Fauquier County, Va.; George West, 
individually and • as Deputy Sher-
iff/Chief Jailer of Fauquier County, 
Va.; Terrell Don Hutto, individually 
ttnd as Director of the Virginia Depart-
ment of Corrections and Virginia De-
partment of Corrections, Defendants, 
and 
The BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF 
FAUQUIER COUNTY, VA., 
Appellee,. 
v. 
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States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia, Albert V. Bryan, Jr., J., 
rendered judgment for county in amount 
less than that requested, and appeal and 
cross appeal were taken. The Court of 
Appeals, Ervin, Circuit Judge, held that: 
(1) insurer was not estopped from asserting 
validity of retroactive cancellations; (2) ret-
roactive cancellation was voidable under 
the doctrine of mutual mistake; (3) failure 
to give prompt written notice did not pre-
clude coverage; and (4) insurer was not 
liable for additional sum which county was 
obligated to pay because it succeeded in 
obtaining a judgment against insurer for a 
specified amount. 
Affirmed. 
HARLEYSVILLE MUTUAL INSUR-
ANCE COMPANY, Appellant. 
Vivian M. HITT, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Luther COX, individually and as Sheriff 
of Fauquier County, Va.; George West, 
individually and as Deputy Sher-
iff/Chief Jailer of Fauquier County, 
Va.; Terrell Don Hutto, individually 
and as Director of the Virginia Depart-
ment of Corrections and Virginia De-
partment of Corrections, Defendants, 
and 
The BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF 
FAUQUIER COUNTY, VA., 
Appellant, 
v. 
HARLEYSVILLE MUTUAL INSUR-
ANCE COMPANY, Appellee. 
Nos. 83-1225, 83-1230. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Fourth Circuit. 
Argued Feb. 7, 1984. 
Decided June 21, 1984. 
County sought indemnification from 
general liability insurer for a settlement of 
suit brought by a former inmate severely 
burned in county jail fire. The United 
1. Insurance <S=>435.3S 
Coverage for injuries which jail inmate 
sustained when mattress on bed in her cell 
caught fire, apparently from cigarette 
smoking, was not within law enforcement 
exclusion endorsement of general liability 
policy where endorsement excluded liability 
for acts or omissions 6f "others" for whom 
county was responsible and county board 
was sued for its own omissions, e.g., fail-
ure to provide funding for proper jail su-
pervision. 
2. Insurance <3==388(5) 
County's general liability insurer was 
not estopped from asserting validity of ret-
roactive cancellation of coverage for coun-
ty jail, notwithstanding insurers' mistaken 
representation that jailh'ouse coverage was 
provided under another policy, as there was 
no indication that representation was made 
with knowledge of true facts and neither 
insured nor insurer intended to leave the 
jail without coverage. 
3. Insurance <s=>246 
Retroactive cancellation of jail cover-
age under county's general liability policy 
was voidable under doctrine of mutual mis-
take where insurer mistakenly informed 
county that jail coverage -was provided un-
der another policy, county relied on that 
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representation and neither party intended 
to leave the jail without coverage. 
4. Insurance <£=>388(2) 
When an insurer, through its agent, 
undertakes to advise an insured on the 
scope of the insured's coverage, it is rea-
sonable per se for the insured to rely on 
the company's representations and a com-
pany which purports to be expert in insur-
ance matters and which purports to repre-
sent its client's interest cannot avoid the 
responsibilities- it has incurred by arguing 
in hindsight that an insured cannot believe 
an insurance agent. Va.Code 1950, § 38.-
1-327.2. 
5. Insurance <s=>540 
County did not waive coverage under 
general liability policy by failing to comply 
with express notice provisions where insur-
er had permitted notice to be given orally 
and oral notice was promptly given and it 
would have been futile to contact insurer 
because insurer was in process of cancel-
ling coverage and insurer's agent had led 
county to believe that coverage was provid-
ed under policy issued by another insurer. 
6. Civil Rights <s=*13.7 
"Official policy" for purpose of deter-
mining liability under Civil Rights Act of 
1871 may be established by the omissions 
of supervisory officials. 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1983. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
7. Insurance <®=>514.6(1) 
Liability insurer's contention that 
$350,000 settlement for burn injuries was 
unreasonable was rejected where medical 
bills alone exceeded $200,000. 
8. Insurance e=»514.6(l) 
Insured's conditional settlement with 
injured party was unreasonable "Where in-
sured, which had $500,000 liability coverage 
would be liable to pay injured party an 
additional $150,000 when it succeeded in 
obtaining a $350,000 judgment, which 
amount was found to be a reasonable set-
tlement, notwithstanding that insured, 
seeking to recover full policy limits from 
insurer, had agreed to pay the additional 
amount even if it only recovered $350,000 
from insurer. 
David P. Durbin, Washington, D.C. (John 
0. Easton, Carr, Jordan, Coyne & Savits, 
Washington, D.C, Carl Anthony Maio, Har-
leysville, Pa., on brief), for appel-
lant/cross-appellee. 
James P. Downey, County Atty., Warren-
ton, Va., for Fauquier County *(J- Sloan 
Kuykendall, Kuykendall, Wetsel & Kuyk-
endall, P.C., Winchester, Va., on brief), for 
appellee/cross-appellant. 
Before ERVIN and CHAPMAN, Circuit 
Judges, and PECK *, Senior Circuit Judge. 
ERVIN, Circuit Judge: 
Fauquier County sought indemnification 
from the Harleysville Mutual Insurance 
Company for attorney's fees and a $500,-
000 settlement it incurred as a result of a 
suit brought by a former inmate severely 
burned in a county jail fire. Harleysville 
had refused to defend the County in the 
original suit and denied liability in the sub-
sequent action for indemnification. The 
district court denied Harleysville's motion 
for summary judgment and after trial, 
awarded th§ County indemnification for 
$350,000 of the settlement as well as attor-
ney's fees, expenses and costs. Harleys-
ville appeals from the denial of its motion 
for summary judgment and from the final 
judgment. Fauquier County cross appeals 
on the issue of damages. We affirm. 
I. 
In 1975 Harleysville became the general 
liability insurance, carrier for the Fauquier 
County Board of Supervisors (the Board). 
The Board's general liability policy provid-
ed "premises-operations" coverage on vari-
ous county buildings including the county 
jail. The policy provided the Board with 
$500,000 of coverage for each bodily injury 
* Honorable John W. Peck, Senior Circuit Judge of the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation. 
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for which the Board may be liable as a drunk driving 
result of an unexpected or unforeseen acci-
dent. The Board renewed this policy on 
June 16, 1979, and extended coverage until 
June 16, 1980. 
In late 1979, a Harleysville underwriter 
contacted Richard Bowen, whose company, 
Carr and Hyde, Inc., had arranged Harleys-
ville's insurance coverage of the Board. 
The underwriter asked Bc-wen to check 
whelher the Board had double coverage for 
the county jail. Bowen discovered that the 
Board had police professional liability cov-
erage through a policy issued by the Ideal 
Mutual Insurance Company. Bowen then 
telephoned the County Finance Director, 
Larry D. Czarda, and told him that "he 
may have found a way to sa've the county 
some money" by eliminating the apparent 
duplicate coverage. Soon after this conver-
sation, Bowen sent a copy of the Ideal 
policy to Harleysville underwriter Mike 
Cash and indicated that he thought the 
Ideal policy duplicated the jail coverage 
under Harleysville's policy. Agreeing that 
the Ideal policy duplicated Harleysville's 
coverage of the jail, Curtis Klause, another 
underwriter, approved on February 21, 
1980 deletion of the county jail from the 
Harleysville policy. Klause indicated on 
cross-examination that Harleysville did not 
intend to leave the Board without insur-
ance coverage of the jail. 
Harleysville formalized the deletion by 
sending a retroactive endorsement dated 
March 17, 1980 to Czarda. The endorse-
ment deleted coverage of the jail from June 
16, 1979, to June 16, 1980. The district 
court specifically found that Czarda did not 
object to the deletion because Bowen had 
assured him "that the Ideal policy con-
tained the same coverage for the jail as the 
Harleysville policy." (J.A. 21) The district 
court also found that the Board had reason-
ably relied on Bowen to determine whether 
there was double coverage. 
Two weeks before Klause approved dele-
tion of the county jail from the Harleysville 
policy, the incidents giving rise to this case 
occurred. In the early morning hours of 
February 3,1980, Vivian Hitt was jailed for 
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After she was left unat-
tended with a package of cigarettes and 
matches, the mattress on the bed in her cell 
caught fire, and she was severely burned. 
Hitt incurred medical bills in excess of 
$200,000, and in February 1982 brought 
suit against the Board, the Sheriff, and the 
Deputy Sheriff under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 
Virginia tort law. 
Before filing a claim with Ideal, the coun-
ty attorney examined the policy and disebv-
ered that the Ideal policy did not cover the 
jail. After filing an answer and making 
further investigation of the circumstances 
surrounding the deletion of jail coverage 
from the Harleysville policy, the county 
attorney wrote to Harleysville on May 13, 
1982, and demanded that Harleysville de-
fend the Board in the Hitt action and pay 
any judgment or settlement resulting from 
the suit. Although the Harleysville policy 
required that written notice of any poten-
tial claim be given "as soon as practicable," 
the district court found that it was the 
practice of Harleysville not to require writ-
ten notice, and that within one week of the 
fire, Czarda had informed Bowen of the 
incident. After receiving the wrritten de-
mand to defend, Harleysville formally de-
nied responsibility for coverage. 
In response to Hitt's complaint, the 
Board moved for summary judgment and 
raised the defenses of good faith and offi-
cial immunity. The district coqrt denied 
the Board's motion but granted Hitt's mo-
tion to strike the Board's defenses. Fol-
lowing these rulings, the Board, on July 5, 
1982, settled with Hitt. The terms of the 
settlement were highly irregular. The 
Board agreed to pay Hitt $350,000 in cash 
on July 15 and agreed to assign an addi-
tional $150,000 to Hitt if it succeeded in an 
action for indemnification against Harleys-
ville. The Board agreed to seek recovery 
of $500,000 (the limit for personal injury 
liability in its insurance policy) from Har-
leysville. However, the Board also agreed 
to pay the additional amount to Hitt even if 
it only recovered $350,000 from the insur-
ance company. 
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The district court concluded that Har-
leysville was estopped from denying cover-
age in this case. It found the $350,000 
settlement reasonable, but refused to 
award the additional $150,000 because the 
Board had only paid $350,000. 
II. 
[1,2] Harleysville argues that the ret-
roactive cancellation of coverage relieves it 
of any liability in this case.1 The district 
court concluded that Harleysville was es-
topped from asserting the validity of the 
retroactive cancellation. We agree with 
Harleysville that the doctrine of estoppel 
does not apply. In Virginia2, estoppel re-
quires that: 
(1) There must have been a false repre-
• sentation or concealment of material 
facts; (2) the representation must have 
been made with knowledge of the facts; 
(3) the party to whom it was made must 
have been ignorant of the truth of the 
matter; (4) it must have been made with 
the intention that the other party should 
act upon it; and (5) the other party must 
have been induced to act upon it. 
Trqyer v. Bristol Parking Inc., 198 Va. 
(#5, G04-05, 95 S.E.2d 224, 231 (1956) (quot-
ing Taylor v. Cussen, 90 Va. 40, 43, 17 S.E. 
721 (1893)). Although Harleysville through 
Bowen made a false representation of fact 
which induced the reliance of an unknow-
t. Harleysville additionally argues that even if its 
policy were in effect, the Law Enforcement Ex-
clusion Endorsement excludes coverage in this 
case. This argument is completely without mer-
it. The endorsement provides: 
It is agreed that this policy or any endorse-
ment attached hereto shall not apply to any 
bodily injury liability, personal injury liabili-
ty, property damage liability, or penalties, 
fines, punitive or exemplary damages because 
of any act or omission of the insured's law 
enforcement agency or of any other person 
for whose acts or omissions the^Insured is 
legally responsible; and arising out of the 
discharge of duties of a law enforcement offi-
cer or official. 
(J.A. 250) (emphasis added). This endorsement 
excludes liability for acts or omissions of "oth-
ers" for whom the insured is responsible as long 
as those acts or omissions arise out of the dis-
charge of law enforcement duties. The Board, 
however, Was sued for its own omissions (e.g. 
ing Board, no evidence indicated that it 
made its representation with knowledge of 
the true facts. Indeed, the district court 
specifically found that the parties did not 
intend to leave the Board without coverage 
for the jail. 
[3] Nonetheless, we conclude the retro-
active cancellation is voidable under the 
doctrine of mutual mistake.3 It is well 
established that "a mutual mistake as to 
the existence of facts which go to the es-
sence of a contract will render a contract 
voidable where it later appears that such 
facts did not exist." United States v. Gar-
land, 122 F.2d 118, 121 (4th Cir.), cert 
denied, 314 U.S. 685, 62 S.Ct. 189, 86 L.Ed. 
548 (1941). Accord Virginia Iron Coal & 
Coke Co. v. Graham, 124 Va. 692, 98 S.E. 
659 (1919). In this case, both parties as-
sumed that the jail was covered under the 
Ideal policy, and the assumed existence of 
this fact led to the retroactive cancellation 
contract. 
Harleysville contends that a mistake can-
not be attributed to it because Bowen was 
not its agent. The district court found to 
the contrary, and its finding is supported 
by the evidence. Carr and Hyde, Inc., for 
which Bowen worked and which he partly 
owned, solicited insurance for Harleysville. 
Under Va.Code § 38.1-327.2, this solicita-
tion conclusively establishes agency. The 
question of agency aside, Curtis Klause, a 
failure to provide funding for proper jail super-
vision). Thus, the exclusion clearly docs not 
apply. 
2. The parties appeared before the district court 
on diversity jurisdiction, and the acts giving rise 
to this suit occurred in Virginia; therefore, we 
apply Virginia law. See Erie Railroad Co. v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S, 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 LEd. 
1188(1938). 
3. Because we hold that the retroactive cancella-
tion was voidable,'we do not address the ques-
tion of whether a retroactive cancellation may 
ever relieve an insurance company from liabili-
ty which it has already incurred. We note, 
however, that there is considerable question 
whether such a cancellation may be effective. 
See Bassett v. Federal Kemper Ins. Co., 565 
S.W.2d 823 (Mo.App.1978)., Ms. Hitt was in-
jured on February 3, 1980, and the retroactive 
cancellation was dated March 17, 1980. 
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Harleysville underwriter and the man who 
approved the deletion of jail coverage, es-
tablished mistake of fact on Harleysville's 
part Klause testified that in deleting the 
Harleysville policy, the company did not 
intend to take away from the Board's total 
coverage. 
[4] As an alternative defense, Harleys-
ville notes that a party seeking relief under 
the mutual mistake doctrine must have ex-
ercised reasonable diligence, Solenberger 
v. Strickler, 110 Va. 273, 65 S.E. 566 
(1909), and argues that the Board's reliance 
on Bowen was unreasonable. The district 
court, however, concluded that it was rea-
sonable for the Board to "place themselves 
in the hands of the man who handled their 
insurance for Harleysville [and] who was 
knowledgeable in that area where they 
were not." (J.A. 240) We believe this 
ruling was correct When an insurance 
company, through its agent, undertakes to 
advise an insured on the scope of the in-
sured's coverage, it is reasonable per se for 
the insured to rely on the company's repre-
sentations. A company which purports to 
be expert in insurance matters and which 
purports to represent its client's interest 
• cannot avoid the responsibilities it has thus 
incurred by arguing in hindsight that an 
insured cannot believe an insurance agent. 
Cf. Farmers* & Mechanics' Benevolent 
Fire Insurance Ass'n v. Williams, 95 Va. 
248, 28 S.E. 214 (1897) (insured entitled to 
rely on representation of agent that fire 
olicy covered insured premises if a night 
•vatchman was employed near the premis-
es). 
III. 
Harleysville also contends that even if 
the retroactive cancellation were not effec-
tive, the Board waived coverage by failing 
to comply with the express notice provi-
sions of the general liability policy. The 
Harleysville insurance policy required that 
written notice of any "occurrence" be "giv-
en as soon as practicable." Hitt was in-
jured February 3,1980. The Board did not 
give its first written notice until May 13, 
1982. 
[5] We agree with the district court 
that two independent grounds excuse the 
Board's failure to give prompt written no-
tice of the Hitt accident. First, the district 
court found on the basis of sufficient evi-
dence that Harleysville frequently permit-
ted notic? to be given orally. In this case 
oral notice was promptly given to Bowen 
over the phone. By customarily relying on 
oral notice, Harleysville waived the written 
notice provision. See Wbodmen of World 
Life Insurance Soc. v. Grant, 185 Va. 288, 
38 S.E.2d 450 (1946) (holder of contractual 
rights may waive them by conduct). Sec-
ond, it would have been futile for the 
Board to contact Harleysville because the 
company was in the process of cancelling 
coverage. Although Harleysville did not 
officially cancel coverage until March 17, 
1980, Bowen led the Board to believe that it 
was covered under the Ideal policy. The 
Board was therefore justified in assuming 
that it would be unnecessary to contact 
Harleysville about the fire. See Andrews 
v. Cahoon, 196 Va. 790, 86 S.E.2d 173 
(1955) (failure to forward summons to in-
surer within reasonable time as required by 
policy excused where insurer has denied 
liability). 
IV. 
[6,7] Harleysville also challenges th^ 
$350,000 settlement as unreasonable. See 
Employers Mutual Liability Insurance 
Co. of Wiscoyisin v. Hendrix, 199 F.2d 53, 
60 (4th Cir.1952) ("in every case of settle-
ment before judgment the reasonableness 
of the compromise is a proper subject of 
inquiry" in a subsequent action by the in-
sured against the insurer). It argues that 
the Board could not possibly have been 
found liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We' 
do not share Harleysville's conviction. Of-
ficial policy for purposes of determining 
§ 1983 liability may be established by the 
omissions of supervisory officials. Avery 
v. County of Burke, 660 F.2d 111, 114 (4 th 
Cir.1981). The County was responsible for 
providing the jail. Va.Code § 15.1-257% 
The County had been informed about the 
inadequacies of matron service (inspection 
7,1 J H"J) t ' JCAh ici'Ii o k I l-.lc :d S E k i E h 
of female cells) and had been asked for 
supplemental funding to extend that ser-
vice. It had also been notified of the risk 
of fire in jail cells in connection with re-
quests for audio monitoring and smoke de-
tectors. It apparently turned down these 
specidl funding requests. Most significant-
ly1 from the Board's perspective, the district 
court had denied the motion for summary 
judgment and struck the Board's defenses 
of good faith and official immunity. Given 
these adverse legal rulings and considering 
the severe injuries sustained by Ms. Hitt 
(she was permanently disfigured), it was 
reasonable for Harleysville to offer Hitt a 
$350,000 settlement, especially in view of 
the fact that her medical bills alone exceed-
ed $200,000. 
V. 
The Board cross appeals from the district 
court's denial of its claim for indemnifica-
tion of the conditional portion of the settle-
ment. The Board became liable to pay Hitt 
an additional $150,000 when it succeeded in 
obtaining a $350,000 judgment against Har-
leysville. Harleysville points out that 
many courts have refused to award indem-
nification for conditional settlements be-
cause the settlement was not a sum that 
the insured was legally obligated to pay. 
For example, in Huffman v. Peerless In-
surance Co., 17 N.C.App. 292, 193 S.E.2d 
773, cert denied, 283 N.C. 257, 195 S.E.2d 
689 (1973), the insured entered into a con-
sent judgment on the condition that the 
judgment be collected from his insurance 
company -without recourse to his personal 
assets. As in the Harleysville insurance 
policy, Peerless agreed to indemnify the 
insured only for amounts that the insured 
was legally obligated to pay. The North 
Carolina Court of Appeals concluded that 
because the insured was not legally obli-
gated to pay damages to the plaintiff? Peer-
less was not liable under its insurance poli-
cy. See also American Casualty Co. v. 
Griffith, 107 Ga.App. 224, 129 S.E.2d 549 
4. But see Cob I en tz v. American Surety Company 
off New York, 416 F.2d 1059 (5th Cir.1969) (in-
surance company which unjustifiably refused to 
defend action against insured cannot challenge 
settlement unless it is tainted by fraud or collu-
(1963); Stubblefield v. St Paul Fire & 
Marine Ins. Co., 267 Or. 397, 517 P.2d 262 
(1973).4 In all the eases cited by Harleys-
ville, however, the insured was not legally 
responsible for paying the conditional set-
tlement. In contrast, the Board has be-
come personally obligated to pay the $150,-
000. This fact distinguishes the cases cited 
by Harleysville from this case. 
[8] We, nevertheless, conclude that 
Harleysville is not liable to indemnify for 
the conditional settlement because we find 
the settlement patently unreasonable. 
When the Board settled with Hitt, it held a 
$500,000 personal injury liability policy 
with Harleysville that it reasonably sus-
pected might be still in effect. Once it 
agreed to settle by paying Hitt $350,000, it, 
had no incentive to avoid an agreement to 
pay an additional $150,000 if Harleysville 
was found liable to indemnify. In this situ-
ation, the negotiating parties no longer 
have adverse interests, and their condition-
al settlement is presumptively unreason-
able. The fact that the Board agreed to 
pay the additional $150,000 even if Harleys-
ville was only found liable for the original 
$350,000 does not establish arm's length 
bargaining. Rather, it reveals an attempt 
to do indirectly what the line of cases cited 
by Harleysville would prevent doing direct-
ly—that is, recover amounts that the in-
sured does not expect to pay out of its own 
resources. To allow the Board full recov-
ery in this case would set a precedent al-
lowing any insured left to defend himself 
• not only ty settle at a reasonable amount, 
but to give away an additional amount up 
to the liability limit of the policy conditional 
on a successful indemnity suit against the 
insurance company, We decline to reach 
such an, unfair resi ilt. 
[ } 
For the foregoing reasons, the district 
court's decision is affirmed in all respects. 
AFFIRMED. 
sion). Cob ten tz, however, is not controlling in 
Virginia and appears to be contrary to the law 
of this circuit. Cf. Employers Mutual Liability 
Ins. Co. of Wisconsin v, Hendrix, 199 F.2d 53, 60 
(4th Cir.1952). 
STEIL v. 
PER CURIAM. 
This case was tried to a jury on the 
issues of negligence and contributory (com-
parative) negligence. The trial court di-
rected a verdict as to the plaintiffs lack of 
contributory negligence. We hold that 
there was no error in the trial judge's 
denial of a motion for mistrial made on the 
ground that plaintiffs counsel, in closing 
argument, informed the jury that they 
would not hear further about the issue of 
the plaintiffs negligence because the trial 
court had ruled as a matter of law that the 
plaintiff was not negligent. 
AFFIRMED. 
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amount of settlement \\ here insurer refus-
es to defend and physician stipulates to 
settlement figure in order to obtain his 
relief from liability, hut (2) explicit wording 
of settlement agreement entered into by 
plaintiff and physician and assignment to 
plaintiff of physician's rights against insur-
er foreclosed plaintiff from making any 
further claim against physician. 
Affirmed m part and reversed in part. 
ORFINGER, C.J., and DAUKSCH 
COWART, JJ , concui 
i l l 
KEY NUMBER SYSTEM V 
Colleen STEIL, \ppellant, 
FLORIDA PHYSICIANS' INSURANCE 
RECIPROCAL, and A. Ronald 
Walker, MP Appellees. 
Nos 83-1082, 83-1083. 
District Court of Appeal of Florida, 
Second District 
\pnl H 11)84. 
In malpractice action, plaintiff sought 
recovery of damage from physician's insur-
er and sought to recover from physician for 
asserted breach of settlement agreement 
entered into between plaintiff and physi-
cian. The Circuit Court for Hillsborough 
County, John M. Gilbert, J., granted de-
fendants' motions to dismiss and dismissed 
complaint with prejudice, and plaintiff ap-
pealed. The District Court of Appeal, 
Grimes, Acting C.J., held that: (1) ordinary 
standard of collusion or fraud is inappropri-
ate in evaluating insurer's obligation to pay 
1 Insurance <S»514.6(2), 612.11 !> 
If insurer's refusal to defend claim 
against insured was improper, insurer 
would not be able to rely upon "no action" 
clause to defeat claim predicated upon in-
sured's settlement, and insurer would not 
necessarily be exonerated on ground that 
insured was able to obtain his own dis-
charge from liability in course of reaching 
agreement with claim ant. 
2. Insurance <^612.1(1) 
Propriety of insurer's refusal to de-
fend will control right of carrier to rely 
upon "no action" clause. 
I Insurance <s=»646 
As condition precedent to any recovery 
against insurer, claimant would have to 
prove that her claim against insured was 
within coverage of policy. 
4. Insurance <s=>514.6(2) 
Ordinary standard of collusion or 
fraud is inappropriate in evaluating insur-
er's obligation to pay amount of settlement 
where insurer refuses to defend and in-
sured stipulates to settlement figure in or-
der to obtain his relief from liability 
ft. Insurance 0=514.6(2) 
Settlement entered into between in-
sured and claimant may not be enforced 
against insurer who has refused to defend 
if such settlement is unreasonable in 
amount or tainted by bad faith. 
(i Insurance c=>646 
Where insurer refuses to defend and 
cliimant and insured enter into settlement, 
paity seeking to enforce settlement against 
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insurer should assume burden of initially 
going forward with production of evidence 
sufficient to make prima facie showing of 
reasonableness and lack of bad faith, even 
though ultimate burden of proof will rest 
upon insurer 
7. Compromise and Settlement ^ ^ ( S ) 
Wording of settlement agreement en-
tered into between insured and claimant 
and assignment to claimant of insured's 
rights against insurer foreclosed claimant 
from making any further claim against in-
sured 
Lee S. Damsker of Maney & UainAci, 
Tampa, for appellant. 
William C. Blake, Jr. and H. Dennis Rog-
ers of Blake & Associates, Tampa, for ap-
pellee Florida Physicians' Ins. Reciprocal. 
F. Ronald Fraley and Timon V. Sullivan, 
Trial Counsel, and Charles P. Schropp and 
Raymond T. Elligett, Jr., Appellate Coun-
sel, of Shackleford, Farrior, Stallings & 
Evans, P.A., Tampa, for appellee A. Ronald 
Walker, M.D 
GRIMES, Acting Chief Judge. 
In this complicated malpractice action, 
the injured plaintiff settled her claim 
against the defendant doctor by acquiring 
an "assignment of his rights against his 
insurance carrier and then discharging him 
from liability. She now asserts her right to 
recover the settlement figure from the in-
surance carrier which had previously de-
nied coverage to the doctor. 
Appellant-plaintiff (Steil) sued Dr. A. 
Ronald Walker (Walker), a physician spe-
cializing in psychiatry, and Florida Physi-
cians' Insurance Reciprocal (carrier). In 
her third amended complaint she alleged 
that she became Walker's patient and that 
he failed to properly diagnose and treat her 
condition. During the course of treatment, 
Walker pursued "a course of conduct in 
which he allowed a counter-transference of 
his personal feeling to plaintiff, contrary to 
accepted psychiatric standards." Steil 
claimed that such negligent course of con-
duct caused her extensive and permanent 
psychiatric injury and humiliation. 
The complaint went on to recite that Steil 
filed a malpractice claim against Walker. 
It was further alleged that Walker's insur-
ance carrier denied that the claim was cov-
ered under the policy and wrongfully refus-
ed to provide Walker with a defense. Ulti-
mately, Steil and Walker entered into a 
written stipulation and agreement for set-
tlement of all claims. Walker acknowl-
edged that he was obligated to Steil for 
$35,000 in damages, and he also gave her a 
written assignment of all his rights and 
causes of action against the carrier as they 
related to Steil's claim except claims for 
attorney's fees. As part of the settlement, 
Steil released Walker from further liability 
and dismissed her claim for malpractice 
against him. Steil asserted that her claim 
against Walker was within the coverage of 
the policy and demanded damages from the 
carrier of $35,000. 
in a second count of the complaint, Steil 
sought a declaratory interpretation of the 
settlement agreement with Walker. She 
also prayed that if the agreement were 
interpreted contrary to her view, the court 
should declare the agreement to be without 
consideration so that she could proceed 
against Walker. In count III she alleged 
what she described as a breach of Walker's 
agreement to pay her $35,000. 
The court granted both defendants' mo-
tions to dismiss. When it appeared that 
Steil did not wish to amend her pleadings 
further, the court dismissed the third 
amended complaint with prejudice. Steil 
then filed separate appeals with respect to 
each defendant. She contends before this 
court that she has sufficiently stated a 
cause of action against both. 
Walker's policy contains the customary 
"no action" clause which provides that no 
action can lie against the carrier until the 
insured's obligation to pay has been finally 
determined, either by judgment against 
him after actual trial or by written agree-
ment entered into by the carrier. The car-
rier's position is that since neither of these 
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il cannot maintain events has occurred 
her suit. 
Steil relies upon the general rule that if 
an insurer wrongfully refuses to defend, 
an insured is entitled to make a reasonable 
settlement without requiring the suit to be 
carried to judgment even though the policy 
purports to avoid liability for a settlement 
made without the insurer's consent. Phoe-
nix Assurance Co. v. Hendry Corp., 267 
So.2d 92 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972), cert, dis-
charged, 277 So.2d 532 (Fla. 1973); Cun-
ningham v. Austin Ford, Inc., 189 So.2d 
661 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966), cert, dismissed, 
198 So.2d 829 (Fla. 1967). The carrier re-
sponds, however, by pointing out that 
Walker has neither paid nor become obli-
gated to pay any monies in satisfaction of 
Steil's claim. The carrier argues that since 
its policy obligations are predicated upon 
Walker's liability, it cannot be held respon-
sible when Walker has been discharged 
from liability without making any payment. 
There is no Florida case in point, al-
though the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
in Coblentz v. American Surety Co., 416 
F.2d 1059 (5th Cir.1969), endeavored to ap-
ply Florida law to a rather similar factual 
situation. In that case the insured stipulat-
ed with the claimant for entry of a $50,000 
judgment against him after the insurance 
carrier withdrew its defense. Despite the 
fact that it was later determined that cov-
erage existed, the trial court directed a 
verdict for the insurer because the stipulat-
ed judgment provided that it could only be 
satisfied from the insured's liability policy. 
The court of appeals reversed and ruled 
that by virtue of the insurer having elected 
to leave the insured to his own defenses, it 
could not later complain about the form of 
the judgment. Since there was no evidence 
that the stipulated judgment was tainted 
by fraud or collusion, the court directed the 
entry of a judgment against the insurer for 
$50,000, 
In addition to Coblentz, a slim majority 
of other jurisdictions permit an injured 
plaintiff to recover from the insurer despite 
the existence of a covenant between the 
plaintiff and the insured to seek relief only 
from the insurer. State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Paynter, 122 
Ariz. 198, 593 P.2d 948 (Ariz.Ct.App.1979): 
Zander v. Casualty Insurance Co., 259 
Cal.App.2d 793, 66 Cal.Rptr. 561 (1968): 
American Family Mutual Insurance Co. 
v. Kivela, Ind.App., 408 N.E.2d 805 (1980): 
Miller v. Shugart, 316 N.W.2d 729 (Minn 
1982); Metcalfv. Hartford Accident & In 
demnity Co., 176 Neb. 468, 126 N.W.2d 
471 (1964); Griggs v. Bertram, 88 N.J. 347, 
443 A.2d 163 (1982); contra Bendall v. 
White, 511 F.Supp. 793 (N.D.Ala.1981); 
American Casualty Co. v. Griffith, 107 
Ga.App. 224, 129 S.E.2d 549 (1963); Huff-
man v. Peerless Insurance Co., 17 N.C. 
App. 292, 193 S.E.2d 773, cert, denied, 283 
N.C. 257, 195 S.E.2d 689 (1973); Stubble-
field v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance 
Co., 267 Or. 397, 517 P.2d 262 (1973). In 
each of these cases except Griffith, a con-
sent judgment was actually entered against 
the insured, along with an agreement that 
the plaintiff would seek only to execute 
against the insured's liability policy. How-
ever, we do not view the failure of formally 
obtaining a consent judgment as a mean-
ingful distinction because the courts sel-
dom inquire into the bona fides of a con-
sent judgment, and even the entry of a 
consent judgment fails to meet the require-
ments of the no action clause. 
[1] By refusing to defend Steil's claim, 
the carrier left Walker to his own devices 
to protect himself in the best way possible. 
If the refusal was improper, we do not 
believe that the carrier can now rely upon 
the "no action" clause to defeat a claim 
predicated upon the insured's settlement. 
Moreover, we hold that the carrier was not 
necessarily exonerated because Walker 
was able to obtain his own discharge from 
liability in the course of reaching an agree-
ment with Steil. Clearly, the intent of Steil 
and Walker was not to release the carrier. 
Cf. Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Cope, 444 
So.2d 1041 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984), petition for 
review granted (Fla. Feb. 6, 1984) (No. 
64,825) (holding that an injured party may 
release a tort-feasor without discharging 
his insurer from a suit for bad faith). 
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[2,3] A further question arises with re-
spect to the insurance issues to be tried. 
Certainly, the propriety of the carrier's re-
fusal to defend must be decided because 
this will control the right of the carrier to 
rely upon the "no action" clause. Presum-
ably because the duty to defend is usually 
broader than the duty to indemnify, Flori-
da Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. 
v. Rice, 393 So.2d 552 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), 
'petition for review denied, 399 So.2d 1142 
(Fla.1981), Steil suggests that the sole is™ 
sue would be whether the carrier breached 
its duty to provide a defense for Walker. 
However, the only effect of a wrongful 
refusal to defend would be to preclude the 
carrier from relying upon the "no action" 
clause. Up to this point, the question of 
coverage has never been decided. There-
fore, as a condition precedent to any recov-
ery against the carrier, Steil will have to 
prove that her claim against Walker was 
within the coverage of the policy. We note 
that in every case in which the plaintiff 
prevailed under what we have characteriz-
ed as the majority rule, the issue of cover-
age was decided in his favor. 
The real concern in this type of case is 
that the settlement between the claimant 
and the insured may not actually represent 
an arm's length determination of the worth 
of the plaintiffs claim. In a situation 
where the insured actually pays for the 
settlement of the claim against him or 
where the case is fully litigated at trial 
before the entry of a judgment, the amount 
of the settlement or judgment can be as-
sumed to be realistic. Therefore, if the 
insurer is later determined to have wrong-
fully refused to defend and the claim is 
within the coverage, it will be obligated to 
pay the amount of the settlement or judg-
ment, at least within its policy limits, in the 
absence of a showing of collusion or fraud. 
1 R. Long, The I aw of Liability Insurance 
§ 5.14 (1983). 
[4-6] However, in the instant case or 
one involving a consent judgment with a 
covenant not to execute, the settlement fig-
ure is more suspect. The conduct of an 
insu red can ha rd 1 y be ch ara cte rized as 
fraudulent simply because he stipulates to 
a large settlement figure in order to obtain 
his release from liability. He has little or 
nothing to lose because he will never be 
obligated to pay. As a consequence, the 
settlement of liability and damages may 
have very little relationship to the strength 
of the plaintiffs claim. Due to this prob-
lem, the ordinary standard of collusion or 
fraud is inappropriate. See Miller v. Shu-
gart. Thus, we hold that in a case such as 
this, a settlement may not be enforced 
against the carrier if it is unreasonable in 
amount or tainted by bad faith. Moreover, 
because the circumstances surrounding the 
settlement will be better known to the par-
ty seeking to enforce it, he should assume 
the burden of initially going forward with 
the production of evidence sufficient to 
make a prima facie showing of reasonable-
ness and lack of bad faith, even though the 
ultimate burden of proof will rest upon the 
carrier. As stated by the New Jersey Su-
preme Court in Griggs v. Bertram when it 
adopted a similar guideline: 
This rule reasonably accommodates and 
compromises the competing interests of 
the parties and considerations of public 
policy. It will discourage collusive or 
overreaching impositions upon insurance 
carriers and, at the same time, will be 
conducive toward encouraging settle-
ment and protecting an insured in its 
efforts amicably to resolve a claim 
against it after having been abandoned 
by its carrier. 
88 N.J. at 368, 443 A.2d at 174. 
[7] The explicit wording of the settle-
ment agreement arid the assignment fore-
closes Steil from making any further claim 
against Walker. Since these documents 
have been vindicated by this opinion, Steil's 
claims against Walker were properly dis-
missed. 
We affirm the order of dismissal in favor 
of Walker in case number 83-1082. We 
reverse the order of dismissal against the 
carrier in case number 83-1083 and remand 
for further proceedings, 
CAMPBELL and LEHAN, JJ., concur. 
